Probabilistic operational semantics for a nondeterministic extension of pure lambda calculus is studied. In this semantics, a term evaluates to a (finite or infinite) distribution of values. Small-step and big-step semantics are both inductively and coinductively defined. Moreover, small-step and big-step semantics are shown to produce identical outcomes, both in call-byvalue and in call-by-name. Plotkin's CPS translation is extended to accommodate the choice operator and shown correct with respect to the operational semantics. Finally, the expressive power of the obtained system is studied: the calculus is shown to be sound and complete with respect to computable probability distributions.
Introduction
Randomized computation is central to several areas of theoretical computer science, including computational complexity, cryptography, analysis of computation dealing with uncertainty, incomplete knowledge agent systems. Some works have been devoted also to the design and analysis of programming languages with stochastic aspects. For various reasons, the functional programming paradigm seems appropriate in this context, because of the very thin gap between the realm of programs and the underlying probability world.
The large majority of the literature on probabilistic functional programming view probability as a monad, in the sense of Moggi [12, 13] . This is the case for the works by Plotkin and Jones about denotational semantics of probabilistic functional programs [10] , or for many of the recently proposed probabilistic functional programming languages: the stochastic lambda calculus [19] and the lambda calculi by Park, Pfenning and Thrun [15, 16] . The monadic structure of probability distributions provides a good denotational model for the calculi and it makes evident how the mathematical foundations of probability can be applied directly in a natural way to the semantics of probabilistic programs. This allows, for example, to apply this approach to the formalization of properties of randomized algorithms in interactive theorem proving [1] . The monadic approach seems particularly appropriate in applications, since some programming languages, like Haskell, directly implement monads.
But there is another, more direct, way to endow the lambda calculus with probabilistic choice, namely by enriching it with a binary choice operator ⊕. This way, we can form terms whose behavior is probabilistically chosen as the one of the first or of the second argument. It is not clear, however, whether the operational theory underlying ordinary, deterministic lambda calculus, extends smoothly to this new, probabilistic setting. The aim of this paper is precisely to start an investigation in this direction. The object of our study will be the nondeterministic lambda calculus, being it a minimal extension of the ordinary lambda calculus with a choice operator. The subject of our study, on the other hand, will be the properties of two notions of probabilistic semantics for it, namely call-by-value and call-by-name evaluation. Big-step and small-step probabilistic semantics will be defined and proved equivalent, both when defined inductively and when defined coinductively. CPS translations extending the ones in the literature are presented and proved to have the usual properties enjoyed in the deterministic case. Finally, some results about the expressive power of the obtained calculus are proved.
Related works
The pioneering investigation in the fields of stochastic functional languages is the probabilistic LCF (PLCF in the following) proposed by Saheb-Djahromi in [20] . PLCF is a typed, higher-order calculus based on Milner's LCF, Plotkin's PCF [18] and Plotkin's probabilistic domains (further developed by Plotkin and Jones in [10] ). The syntax of PLCF, two kinds of abstractions are present which deal separately with call-by-value and call-by-name evaluation, respectively. The author declares an explicit intent in providing "a foundation for the probabilistic study of the computation" and even if a number of important aspects are unexplored, the approach is interesting and related to the present investigation. Saheb-Djahromi provides both denotational and operational semantics for PLCF. Denotational semantics, defined in terms of probabilistic domains, is an extension of Milner's and Plotkin's one. Operational semantics is a given as a Markov chain, and an equivalence result between the latter and a denotational model is stated and proved as an extension of Plotkin's results.
In recent years, some lambda calculi with probabilistic features have been introduced, strongly oriented to applications (e.g. robotics). The most developed approach is definitely the monadic one [12, 13] , based on the idea that probability distribution forms a monad ( [8] , [10] ). In [19] , Ramsey and Pfeffer introduce the stochastic lambda calculus, in which the denotation of expressions are distributions and in which the probability monad is shown to be useful in the evaluation of queries about the defined probabilistic model. A measure theory and a simple measure language are introduced and the stochastic lambda calculus is compiled into the measure language. Moreover, a denotational semantics based upon the monad of probability measures is defined. In [14] , Park define the typed calculus λ γ , an extension of the typed lambda calculus with an integral abstraction and a sampling construct, which bind probability and sampling variables respectively. A system of simple types for λ γ is also introduced. The author briefly discusses about the expressive power of λ γ : the calculus has been shown to be able to express the most relevant probability distributions. λ γ does not make use of monads, which are however present in [15] , in which the idea of a calculus based on the mathematical notion of a sampling function is further developed through the introduction of λ • . λ • is based on the monad of sampling functions and is able to specify probability distributions over infinite discrete domains and continuous domains. The authors also develop a new operational semantics, called horizontal operational semantics. The calculus λ • is further studied and developed in [16] .
Nondeterminism and probability, however, can find their place in a completely different way. In [6] , de'Liguoro and Piperno propose a non deterministic lambda calculus, called Λ ⊕ . Λ ⊕ is nothing more than the usual, untyped, λ-calculus with an additional binary operator ⊕ which serves to represent binary, nondeterministic choice: M ⊕ N rewrites to either M or N . The authors give a standardization theorem and an algebraic semantics for Λ ⊕ . The classical definition of a Böhm tree is extended to the non-deterministic case by means of inductively defined "approximating operators". Several relevant properties such as discriminability are studied and, moreover, some suitable models for non-deterministic lambda calculus are proposed and discussed. In [7] , Di Pierro, Henkin and Wiklicky propose an untyped lambda calculus with probabilistic choice. Its syntax is itself an extension of pure lambda calculus with n-ary probabilistic choice in the form n i=1 p i : M i . The main objective, however, is showing how probabilistic abstract interpretation can be exploited in the context of static analyis of probabilistic programs even in presence of higher-order functions. This is reflected by its operational semantics, which is more directed to program analysis (when two terms can be considered as equal?) than to computation (what is the value obtained by evaluating a program? how can we compute it?).
Outline
After some motivating observations about the interplay between rewriting and nondeterministic choice (Section 2), the calculus Λ ⊕ and its call-by-value probabilistic operational semantics are introduced (Section 4 and Section 5, respectively). Both small-step and big-step semantics are defined and their equivalence is proved in detail. Remarkably, the result holds even when operational semantics is formulated coinductively. The same results hold for call-by-name evaluation and are described in Section 6. Call-by-value and call-by-name can be shown to be able to simulate each other by slight modifications of the well-known CPS translations [17] , described in Section 7. The paper ends with a result about the expressive power of the calculus namely the equivalence between representable and computable distributions.
Some Motivating Observations
Lambda calculus can be seen both as an equational theory on lambda terms and as an abstract model of computation. In the first case, it is natural (and customary) to allow to apply equations (e.g. β or η equivalences) at any position in the term. The obtained calculus enjoys confluence, in the form of the the so-called Church-Rosser theorem: equality of terms remains transitive even if equations becomes rewriting rules, i.e. if they are given with an orientation. More computationally, on the other hand, the meaning of any lambda-term is the value it evaluates to in some strategy or machine. In this setting, abstractions are often considered as values, meaning that reduction cannot take place in the scope of a lambda abstraction. What's obtained this way is a calculus with weak reduction which is not confluent in the Church-Rosser sense. As an example, take the term (λx.λy.x)((λz.z)(λz.z)). In call-by-value, it reduces to λy.(λz.z). In call-by-name, it reduces to λy.(λz.z)(λz.z). A beautiful operational theory has developed since Plotkin's pioneering's work [17] . Call-by-value and call-by-name have been shown to be dual to each other [2] , and continuation-based translations allowing to simulate one style with the other have been designed and analyzed very carefully [3, 4] . Now, suppose to endow the lambda calculus with nondeterministic sums. Suppose, in other words, to introduce a binary infix term operator ⊕ such that M ⊕ N can act either as M or N in a nondeterministic flavor. What we obtain is the so-called nondeterministic lambda-calculus, which has been introduced and studied in [6] . We cannot hope to get any confluence results in this setting (at least if we stick to reduction as a binary relation on terms): a term like M = M ⊕ M ⊥ . (where M = λx.λy.x and M ⊥ = λx.λy.y are the usual representation of truth values in the lambda-calculus) reduces to two distinct values (which are different in a very strong sense!) in any strategy. The meaning of any lambda term, here, is a set of values accounting for all the possible outcomes. The meaning of M , as an example, is the set {M , M ⊥ }. Nontermination, mixed with nondeterministic choice, implies that the meaning of terms can even be an infinite set of values. As an example, take the lambda term
where Y is a fixed-point combinator, V n represents the natural number n ∈ N and M succ computes the successor. Evaluating it (e.g. in call-by-value) produces the infinite set
It's clear that ordinary ways to give an operational semantics to the lambda-calculus (e.g. a finitary, inductively defined, formal system) do not suffice here, since they intrinsically attribute a finitary meaning to terms. So, how can we define small-step and big-step semantics in a nondeterministic setting?
Another problematic point is confluence. The situation is even worse than in ordinary, deterministic, lambda calculus. Take the following term [20, 21] :
where M xor = λx.λy.(x(λz.zM ⊥ M )(λz.zM M ⊥ ))y is a term computing a parity function of the two bits in input. When reducing it call-by-value, we obtain the outcome {M ⊥ }, while reducing it call-by-name, we obtain {M , M ⊥ }. This phenomenon is due to the interaction between nondeterministic choice and copying: in call-by-value we choose before copying, and the final result can only be of a certain form. In call-by-name, we copy before choosing, getting distinct outcomes. What happens to CPS translations in this setting? Is it still possible to define them?
The aim of this paper is precisely to give answers to the questions above. Or, better, to give answers to their natural, quantitative generalizations obtained by considering ⊕ as an operator producing any of two possible outcomes with identical probability.
A Brief Introduction to Coinduction
Coinduction is a definitional principle dual to induction, which support a proof principle. It is a very useful instrument for reasoning about diverging computations and unbounded structures. Coinductive techniques are not yet as popular as inductive techniques; for this reason, in this section we give a short introduction to coinduction, following [11] .
An inference system over a set U of judgments is a set of inference rules. An inference rule is a pair (A, c), where c ∈ U is the conclusion of the rule and A ⊆ U is the set of its premises or antecedents. An inference system Φ over U is a set of inference rules over U.
The usual way to give meaning to an inference system is to consider the fixed points of the associated inference operator. If Φ is an inference system over U, we define the operator
In other words, F Φ (A) is the set of judgments that can be inferred in one step from the judgments in A by using the inference rules. A set A is said to be closed if F Φ (A) ⊆ A, and consistent if A ⊆ F Φ A. A closed set A is such that no new judgments can be inferred from A. A consistent set A is such that all judgments that cannot be inferred from A are not in A. The inference operator is monotone:
By Tarski's fixed point theorem for complete lattices, it follows that the inference operator possesses both a least fixed point and a greatest fixed point, which are the smallest closed set and the largest consistent set, respectively:
The least fixed point lfp(F Φ ) is the inductive interpretation of the inference system Φ, and the greatest fixed point gfp(F Φ ) is its coinductive interpretation. These interpretations lead to the following two proof principles: • Induction principle: to prove that all judgments in the inductive interpretation belong to a set A, show that A is F Φ -closed.
• Coinduction principle: to prove that all judgments in a set A belong to the coinductive interpretation, show that A is
Example 1 (Finite and Infinite Trees) Let us consider all those (finite and infinite) trees whose nodes are labelled with a symbol from the alphabet {•, •}, Example of finite trees are
while an example of an infinite tree is the (unique!) tree t such that t = • t, t, t . Let U the set of judgments in the form t ⇓, where t is a possibly infinite tree as above. Moreover, let Φ be the inference system composed by all the instances of the two rules below:
The inductive interpretation of Φ contains all judgements t ⇓ where t is finite tree, while its coinductive interpretation contains also all judgments t ⇓ where t is infinite.
Syntax and Preliminary Definitions
In this section we introduce the syntax of Λ ⊕ , a language of lambda terms with binary choice introduced by de'Liguoro and Piperno [6] . This is the language whose probabilistic semantics is the main topic of this paper.
The most important syntactic category is certainly those of terms. Actually, Λ ⊕ is nothing more than the usual untyped and pure lambda calculus, endowed with a binary choice operator ⊕ which is meant to represent nondeterministic choice.
Definition 1 (Terms) Let X = {x, y, . . .} be a denumerable set of variables. The set Λ ⊕ of term expressions, or terms is the smallest set such that: The reduction relation → considered in [6] is obtained by extending usual β-reduction with two new reduction rules, namely M ⊕ N → M and M ⊕ N → N , which can be applied in every possible context. In this paper, following Plotkin [17] , we concentrate on weak reduction: computation can only take place in applicative (or choice) contexts.
Notation 1
In the following, we sometimes need to work with finite sequences of terms. A sequence M 1 , . . . , M n is denoted as M . This notation can be used to denote sequences obtained from other sequences and terms, e.g., M ⊕ N is M ⊕ N 1 , . . . , M ⊕ N n whenever N is N 1 , . . . , N n .
Distributions
In the probabilistic semantics we will endow Λ ⊕ with, a program reduces not to a single value but rather to a distribution of possible observables, i.e. to a function assigning a probability to any value. This way, all possible outputs of all binary choices are taken into account, each with its own probability. Divergence is indeed a possibility in the untyped setting and our definition reflects it.
P denotes the set of all probability distributions. 2. A proper probability distribution is a probability distribution such that V ∈Val D(V ) = 1.
3. Given a probability distribution D, its support S(D) is the subset of Val whose elements are values to which D attributes positive probability. 4. Given a probability distribution D, its sum
The notion of a probability distribution as we give it is general enough to capture the semantics of those terms which have some nonnull probability of diverging. We use the expression {V 
The structure (P, ≤) is a partial order, but not a lattice [5] : the join of two distributions D and E does not necessarily exist in P. However, (P, ≤) is a complete meet-semilattice, since meets are always guaranteed to exist: for every A ⊆ P, the greatest lower bound of distributions in A is itself a distribution. Please observe, on the other hand, that all functions from Val to R ∞ actually form a complete lattice. And that (·) as a function from those functions to R ∞ is actually a complete lattice homomorphism.
Call-by-Value
In this section, four ways to give a probabilistic semantics to Λ ⊕ are introduced, all of them following the so-called call-by-value passing discipline.
A (weak) call-by-value notion of reduction can be obtained from ordinary reduction by restricting it in such a way that only values are passed to functions. Accordingly, choices are only made when both alternatives are themselves values:
Definition 5 (Call-by-value Reduction) Leftmost reduction → v is the least binary relation between Λ ⊕ and Λ * ⊕ such that:
Please, notice that reduction is not probabilistic. In fact, reduction is a relation between terms and unlabeled sequences of terms without any reference to probability. Informally, if M → v N 1 . . . N n means that M rewrites in one step to every N i with the same probability 1/n. Clearly, n ∈ {1, 2} whenever M → v N 1 . . . N n . Notice again how the evaluation of both branches of a binary choice is done before performing the choice itself. One the one hand, this is very much in the style of call-by-value evaluation. On the other, a more standard notion of choice, which is performed before evaluating the brances can be easily encoded as follows:
where z does not appear free in M nor in N .
CbV Small-step Semantics
Following the general methodology described in [11] , we model separately convergence and divergence. Finite computations are, as usual, inductively defined, while divergence can be captured by interpreting a different set of rules coinductively. Both definitions give some quantitative information about the dynamics of any term M : either a distribution of possible outcomes is associated to M , or the probability of divergence of M is derived. Both induction and coinduction can be used to characterize the distribution of values a term evaluates to. In an inductive characterization, one is allowed to underapproximate the target distribution, but then takes an upper bound of all the approximations. In a coinductive characterization, on the other hand, one can naturally overapproximates the distribution, then taking a lower bound.
Inductive CbV Small-Step Semantics for Convergence
A small-step semantics for convergence is captured here by way of a binary relation ⇒ IV between terms in Λ ⊕ and distributions. The relation ⇒ IV is defined as the inductive interpretation of the inference system whose rules are all possible instances of the following ones:
As usual, N stands for the sequence N 1 , . . . N n . Since the relation ⇒ IV is inductively defined, any proof of judgments involving ⇒ IV is a finite object. If π is such a proof for M ⇒ IV D, we write
The proof π is said to be structurally smaller or equal to another proof ρ if the number of rule instances in π is smaller or equal to the number of rule instances in ρ. In this case, we write π ρ.
First of all, observe that ⇒ IV is not a function: many different distributions can be put in correspondence with the same term M . Moreover, there is one distribution D such that M ⇒ IV D always holds, independently on M , namely ∅. Actually, rule se IV allows you to "give up" while looking for a distribution for M and conclude that M is in relation with ∅. In other words, ⇒ IV is not meant to be a way to attribute one distribution to every term, but rather to find all finitary approximants of the (unique!) distribution we are looking for (see Definition 6) .
The set of the distributions that a term evaluates to is a direct set:
Proof. By induction on the structure of derivations for M ⇒ IV D.
•
. . , k, there are some cases:
, and by definition D ≤ F and E ≤ F . This concludes the proof.
We are now ready to define what the small-step semantics of any term is:
Please observe that such a distribution is always guaranteed to exist, precisely because of Lemma 1. Indeed
since D is at most 1, by hypothesis.
Example 2
The term (λx.x)(λx.x) evaluates to F = ∅, by means of rules se IV , and to E = {λx.x 1 }, by means of rules sm IV and sv IV . By definition, S IV (M ) = E .
Coinductive CbV Small-step Semantics for Divergence
Divergence is captured by another, coinductively defined binary relation ⇒ ∞ between Λ ⊕ and ] . Rules defining the underlying inference systems are those obtained from
where N is N 1 , . . . N n . The relation ⇒ ∞ deals naturally with infinite computations, being coinductively defined. This allows to derive the divergence probability p of a term in Λ ⊕ . Rules dv v and dm v can be read as follows: values diverge with probability 0, while probability of divergence for a term M is equal to the normalized sum of its reducts' probabilities of divergence. The following example stresses a crucial point:
Example 3 Let us consider the well-know diverging term Ω = ∆∆, where ∆ = λx.xx. We would like to be able to prove that Ω ⇒ ∞ 1 , namely that Ω diverges with probability 1. Doing that formally requires proving that some sets of judgments A including Ω ⇒ 
Coinductive CbV Small-Step Semantics for Convergence
If one takes the inductive semantics from Section 5.1.1, drops se IV and interpret everything coinductively, what came out is an alternative semantics for convergence:
Interpreting everything coinductively has the effect of allowing infinite computations to be modeled. But this allows to "promise" to reach a certain distribution without really being able to fullfill this:
Example 4 Consider again Ω. One would like to be able to prove that Ω ⇒ CV ∅. Unfortunately, the coinductive interpretation of the formal system above contains Ω ⇒ CV D for every distribution D, as can be easily verified
The solution to the problem highlighted by the example above is just defining the coinductive semantics of any term M just as
CbV Big-Step Semantics
An alternative style to give semantics to programming languages is the so-called big-step semantics. Big-step semantics is more compositional than small-step: the meaning of a term can be obtained from the meanings of its sub-terms. Probabilistic big step semantics for Λ ⊕ can be given by a binary relation ⇓ CV between Λ ⊕ and distributions. It is the coinductive interpretation of (all instances of) the following rules:
The most interesting rule is definitely ba v : to give semantics to an application M N , we first give semantics to M and N , obtaining two distributions D and E , respectively. Then, for every λx.P in S(D) and for every V in S(E ), we evaluate P {x/V }, obtaining some distributions F P,V . The meaning of M N is nothing more that the sum of all such distributions F P,V , each weighted by the probability of getting λx.P and V in D and E , respectively. This way of defining the big-step semantics of applications can be made simpler, at the price of making the task of deriving semantic assertions harder, by replacing the premise
Another interesting rule is bs v . Please observe how the distributions D and E must be normalized by E and D (respectively) when computing the result. This reflects call-by-value evaluation: if any of M and N diverges, their sum must diverge, too.
Like ⇒ IV and ⇒ CV , the relation ⇓ CV is not a function: many possible distributions can be assigned to the same term M , in particular when M (possibly) diverges. In particular, distributions which somehow overapproximate the "real one" can always be attributed to M by the rules above. Thus, we define the big-step semantics of each lambda-term in the following way:
Example 5 Let us consider again Ω, from Example 3. As it can be verified, Ω ⇓ CV D for all possible distributions D. To formally prove that, we need to find a consistent set A (with respect to ⇓ CV ) containing all judgments in the form Ω ⇓ CV D. A is actually the set
Clearly, A is consistent, since any judgment in A can be obtained from other judgments in A in one deduction step:
One may wonder whether an inductive big step semantics can be defined for Λ ⊕ . The answer is positive: one only needs to add a rule attributing the empty distribution to any terms, in the spirit of the small-step inductive semantics from Section 5.1.1. In other words, we obtain the system
As can be expected, the inductive big step semantics B IV (M ) of an term M is simply sup M ⇓ IV D . This is similar to the semantics considered by Jones [9] .
Divergence and Convergence in CbV Small-step Semantics
In the last two sections, various operational semantics for both convergence and divergence have been introduced. Clearly, one would like them to be essentially equivalent, i.e., one would like them to attribute the same meaning to programs. In this section, divergence and convergence small-step semantics will be compared and proved equivalent: the probability of divergence of M obtained through ⇒ ∞ will be proved to be equal to 1 − S IV (M ). In Section 5.4 small-step and big-step semantics for convergence will be proved to produce identical outcomes. The first step consists in proving that 1 − S IV (M ) is a lower bound to divergence probability of any term M .
Theorem 1 For every term
Proof. We can prove that all judgments M ⇒ ∞ 1− S IV (M ) belong to the coinductive interpretation of the underlying formal system Φ. To do that, we need to prove that the set A of all these judgements is consistent, i.e. that A ⊆ F Φ (A). This amounts to show that if c ∈ A, then there is a derivation for c whose immediate premises are themselves in A. Let's distinguish two cases:
, with i ∈ [1, n]: they are all in the set A. Finally, consider the judgement
: it is in F Φ (A) because of the presence of rule dm v :
It remains to show that
This concludes the proof.
We need something else, however, namely that summing some divergence probability and the convergence probability obtained through convergence semantics, we cannot go beyond 1:
The proof goes by induction on the structure of the derivation for M ⇒ IV D:
• If the only rule in the derivation is
then we apply the induction hypothesis on each
. Then we have:
Everything can be now glued together as follows, exploiting the density of real numbers:
And this is not possible by Proposition 1.
Relating the Various Definitions for Convergence
Our goal in this section consists in proving that the four ways we have defined the semantics of a term in Λ ⊕ (inductive and coinductive, big-step and small-step semantics) attribute identical meanings to any term. One possibility could be to proceed by "proving" three edges of the following diagram:
The vertical edges relate two formulations given with identical "inductive flavors" but differing as to whether they are big-step or small-step. Conversely, horizontal edges put in correspondence two formulations which are both big-step or small step, but which differ as to which kind of interpretation is taken over the same set of rules. Horizontal edges are definitely more interesting to be proved, but vertical ones are important, too. In order to avoid tedious and long (but not necessarily informative) proofs, we only prove the diagonal edge shown below in this paper:
This proof shows the difficulties of both "vertical" and "horizontal" edges. Before embarking in the proof of this result, a brief explanation of the architecture of the proof is maybe useful.
Consider any term M , and define two sets of distributions M S IV and M B CV as, respectively, the sets of probability distributions which can be attributed to M in small-step semantics and big-step semantics, respectively:
We proceed in two steps:
• First of all, we prove that big-step semantics dominates small-step semantics, namely that
IV . This way, we are sure that B CV (M ) ≥ S IV (M ). Details are in Section 5.4.1 below.
• Then, we prove that small step semantics can itself be derived using big-step semantics, namely that
CV . This way, we immediately obtain that The fact any distribution obtained through big-step semantics is bigger than any distribution obtained through small-step semantics can be proved by induction on the structure of (finite!) derivations for the latter. Compulsory to that, however, is proving that whenever M ⇒ IV D and M is, say, a sum N ⊕ L, then appropriate judgments N ⇒ IV E and L ⇒ IV F can be derived. Similarly for applications.
The following lemma formalizes these ideas and it is a technical tool for Proposition 2.
Lemma 2 If M ⇒ IV D, then at least one of the following conditions hold:
M is a value V and D = {V 1 }; 3. M is an application N L and there are (finite) distributions E and F and for every λx.P ∈ S(E ) and V ∈ S(F ) a distribution G P,V such that:
M is a sum N ⊕ L and there are (finite) distributions E and F such that:
Proof. First of all, let us prove the following auxiliary lemma:
Lemma 3 If I is finite and π i : M ⇒ IV D i for every i ∈ I, then there is ρ : M ⇒ IV sup i∈I D i . Moreover ρ π i for some i ∈ I.
The proof goes by induction on the structure of the proofs in the family {π i } i∈I (which can actually be done, since I is finite). Let's now go back to Lemma 2. This is an induction on derivations for M ⇒ IV D. The cases where π is obtained by the rules without premises are trivial. So, we can assume that π has the form
where Q is Q 1 , . . . , Q n . Let's distinguish some cases depending on how the premise M → v Q is derived • Suppose M = N L and that N → v R. Then Q = RL. From the induction hypothesis applied to the derivations π i : R i L ⇒ IV D i , we obtain that • Either all of the D i is ∅. In this case D is itself ∅, and a derivation for M ⇒ IV ∅ can be defined.
• Or there is at least one among the derivation π i to which case 3 applies. Suppose that k 1 , . . . , k m are the indices in [1, n] to which case 3 can be applied. This means that for every in i in {1, . . . , m}, there is a distribution E i , F i and for every λx.P ∈ S(E i ) and V ∈ S(F i ) a distribution H i P i ,V i such that:
Moreover, ρ i , ξ i , φ i g,h ≺ π t , and
Clearly, a derivation ρ for N ⇒ IV E can be defined such that ρ ≺ π: simply construct it from the derivations ρ i and some derivations for
Similarly, derivations µ P,V can be defined for every λx.P ∈ S(E ) and for every V ∈ S(F ) in such a way that µ P,V ≺ π, µ P,V : P {V /x} ⇒ IV G P,V and G P,V = sup
This case is very similar to the previous one. Note that since we reduce in a call by value setting, then N ∈ Val and by means of small-step semantics rules, N ⇒ IV {N 1 }.
• Suppose M = N L and that we are in presence of a redex, i.e. N is in the form λx.R and L is a value and L ⇒ IV {L 1 }. Then Q is the unary sequence R{L/x}. The thesis easily follows by induction, taking π : R{L/x} ⇒ IV D as premise, where • Either all of the distributions D i is ∅, then D is ∅ itself and a derivation for M ⇒ IV ∅ can be defined.
• Or there is at least one derivation among π to which case 4 applies. Suppose that k 1 , . . . , k m are the indices in [1, n] to which case 3 can be applied. For every in i in {1, . . . , m}, there are two distributions E i and F i . Moreover, again by induction hypothesis, we have
where for each i ∈ [1, m], F i ≤ F holds because F is the least upper bound of the F i .
Similar to the previous case.
• Suppose M = V ⊕ W and that M → v V, W . In this case the subderivations which we are looking for are π : V ⇒ IV D and ρ : W ⇒ IV E . This concludes the proof. Now, suppose that M ⇒ IV D and M ⇓ CV E . Lemma 2 provides all what is needed to "unfold" the hypothesis M ⇒ IV D and obtain judgments matching exactly those coming from M ⇓ CV E . We easily get:
Proof. By induction on the structure of a proof for M ⇒ IV D, applying Lemma 2 and doing some case analysis based on its outcome:
• If M = V and D = {V 1 }, then E = D, because the only rule for values in the big step semantic is = ======= = bv v V ⇓ CV {V }
• If M is an application N L and distributions F , G , H P,V and derivations ρ, ξ, µ P,V exist as in Lemma 2, we can observe, by induction hypothesis, that there exist distributions I and J such that N ⇓ CV I , L ⇓ CV J where I ≥ F and J ≥ G . Then we have that S(I ) ⊇ S(F ) and S(J ) ⊇ S(G ). Now, for every λx.P ∈ S(F ) and V ∈ S(G ), suppose K P,V is such that P {V /x} ⇓ CV K P,V . Again by induction hypothesis, we obtain that K P,V ≥ H P,V . Finally:
• If M is N ⊕ L, we can proceed exactly as in the previous case. In fact, there exist distributions F , G and derivations ρ, ξ as in Lemma 2, and by induction hypothesis we can observe that for any distributions I and J such that N ⇓ CV I and L ⇓ CV J , I ≥ F and J ≥ G hold. We can take I such that S(I ) ⊇ S(F ) and I (V ) ≥ F (V ) for each V ∈ S(F ), and we can take J such that S(J ) ⊇ S(G ) and J (V ) ≥ G (V ) for each V ∈ S(G ). Then we have:
Small-Step is in Big-Step
Whenever M ⇒ IV D and M is not a value, one can always "decompose" D and find some judgments about the immediate subterms of M . This is Lemma 2. If we want to prove that the small-step semantics S IV (M ) of M can be itself attributed to M in the big-step case, we should somehow prove the converse, namely that judgments about the immediate subterms of M can be packaged into an analogous judgment for M .
Lemma 4 Let M ∈ Λ ⊕ be any term. Then:
Proof. Let us prove the three statements separately:
• If M is a value V , then the only possible judgments involving M are M ⇒ IV {V 1 } and M ⇒ IV ∅. The thesis trivially holds.
• If M is an application N L, then we prove statement 2 by induction on the derivations N ⇒ IV E and L ⇒ IV F . Let's distinguish some cases:
We derive M ⇒ IV ∅ by means of the rule se IV and the thesis holds.
• If N ⇒ IV E = ∅, suppose that the least rule applied in the derivation is
1 n E i . It is possible to apply the induction hypothesis on every R i L:
We are able to construct a derivation D in the following way:
And finally we have:
• Other cases follows can be handled similarly to the previous one.
• M is a sum N ⊕ L. We prove the result by induction on the derivations N ⇒ IV E and L ⇒ IV F .
• If N ⇒ IV ∅, then
• If N is a value V , the only interesting case is the one in which L is not a value and also L ⇒ IV F with F = ∅ (in fact if L ⇒ IV ∅ we are in the previous case and if L is a value the proof is trivial). Then M = V ⊕ L. Let us consider the derivation of the judgment L ⇒ IV F : the last rule applied in the derivation is
We can apply the induction hypothesis to each L ⇒ IV n i=1 1 n F i and to V ⇒ IV {V 1 }, and we obtain
We are able to construct a derivation in the following way:
Finally we have:
• If N ⇒ IV E , suppose that the least rule applied in the derivation is
1 n E i . It is possible to apply the induction hypothesis on the single
We construct a derivation in the following way:
• Other cases are trivial. This concludes the proof. Lemma 2 and Lemma 4 allows to prove that the S IV (·) commutes well with the various constructs of Λ ⊕ .
Lemma 5 For each term
Proof. We will use the following fact throughout the proof:
The inequalities above can be proved separately:
• If M is a value, the thesis follows by small step semantics rules. Indeed, M ⇒ IV ∅.
• For the other cases, the (≤) direction follows from Lemma 2 and Fact 1; ≥ direction follows from Lemma 4 and Fact 1. This concludes the proof.
The fact S IV (M ) can be assigned to M in the big-step semantics is an easy consequence of Lemma 5:
Proof. We will prove the thesis by coinduction: We can prove that all judgments M ⇓ CV S IV (M ) belong to the coinductive interpretation of the underlying formal system Φ (in this case, the formal system is Φ = {bv v , ba v , bs v }). To do that, we need to prove that the set A of all those judgments is consistent, i.e. that A ⊆ F Φ (A). This amounts to show that if c ∈ A, then there is a derivation for c whose immediate premises are themselves in A. Let's distinguish some cases:
1 } by bv v rule, and
and the family of judgments {{P {V /x}} ⇓ CV S IV ({P {V /x}})} λx.P ∈S(S IV (N )),V ∈S(S IV (L)) : we will prove that the judgment N L ⇓ CV S IV (N L) can be derived in a single step from c 1 , c 2 and those in the family above by means of ba v rule. Simply observe that
The thesis follows applying Lemma 5.
• If M is a sum N ⊕ L, take the judgment c 1 = N ⇓ CV S IV (N ) and c 2 = M ⇓ CV S IV (L): we will prove that the judgment N ⊕ L ⇓ CV S IV (N L) can be inferred in a single step from c 1 and c 2 by means of bs v rules. Clearly, c 1 and c 2 belong to A. Moreover
and by Lemma 5, case 3 we obtain the thesis. This concludes the proof.
The equality between big-step and small-step semantics is a corollary of Proposition 2 and Proposition 3.
Theorem 2 B CV (M ) = S IV (M ).
6 Call-by-Name
In Section 5 we endowed Λ ⊕ with a call-by-value probabilistic operational semantics and showed that the distribution assigned to any term M is the same in big-step and in small-step semantics, independently on whether they are defined inductively or coinductively. Actually, the same holds in call-by-name: both big-step and small-step semantics can be defined (co)inducively and proved equivalent, following the same path used in call-by-value. In this section, we briefly sketch how this can be done, by defining B CN (M ) and S IN (M ) and by proving they are equivalent.
Definition 8 (Call-by-name Reduction) Leftmost reduction → n is the least binary relation between Λ ⊕ and Λ * ⊕ such that:
Note that, contrarily to call-by-value, in call-by-name it is possible to perform a choice between terms which are not values.
Small-step Semantics
As for call-by-name, we model separately terminating and non-terminating computations. The rule schema is the same, up to the different reduction relation → n . First of all, there is an inductively defined binary relation ⇒ IN between Λ ⊕ and distributions. Rules are as follows:
Moreover, there is also another, coinductively defined binary relation between Λ ⊕ and R [0,1] capturing divergence. Rules are as follows:
Notice how the differences between call-by-value and call-by-name small-step semantics all come from the reduction relation, since the rules above are analogous to their call-by-value siblings.
As done in Section 5.1.3 for call-by-name, a conductive version of call-by-name small step semantics can be easily defined.
Big-step Semantics.
We define call-by-name big-step semantics of terms in Λ ⊕ as the co-inductive interpretation of a suitable set of rules. Again, this allow us to capture infinite computations. A coinductively defined binary relation ↓ CN between Λ ⊕ and distributions is obtained by taking all instances of the following rules:
The way binary choices are managed reflects the reduction rules, which allow to evaluate a binary choice to one of its components even if the latter are not values. Indeed, while in call-by-value normalization factors D and E were necessary, they are not here anymore. Inductive call-by-name big step semantics can be obtained adding the rule which assigns the empty distribution to any term and taking the inductive interpretation of the system.
Comparing the Different Notions
We retrace here results of Section 5.3 and Section 5.4 for call-by-name semantics.
Divergence and Convergence in CbN Small-step Semantics
Convergence and divergence call-by-name small step semantics are proved equivalent by means of the following results. 
Small-step vs. Big-step
We prove here the equivalence between inductive call-by-name small step semantics S IN (M ) and coinductive call-by-name big step semantics B CN (M ). We use the same proof technique of Section 5.3.
Given any term M , the sets of distributions sets of probability distributions which can be attributed to M in call-by-name small-step semantics and call-by-name big-step semantics, are respectively defined as M • Suppose M = N L and that N → v R. Then Q = RL. From the induction hypothesis applied to the derivations π i :
In this case D is itself ∅, and a derivation for M ⇒ IN ∅ can be defined.
• Or there is at least one among the derivation π i to which case 3 applies. Suppose that k 1 , . . . , k m are the indices in [1, n] to which case 3 can be applied. This means that for every in i in {1, . . . , m}, there is a distribution E i , and for every λx.P ∈ S(E i ) a distribution H i P i such that:
Moreover, ρ i , φ i g,h ≺ π t , and
Clearly, a derivation ρ for N ⇒ IV E can be defined such that ρ ≺ π: simply construct it from the derivations ρ i and some derivations for R j ⇒ IV ∅. Moreover, a derivations µ P can be defined for every λx.P ∈ S(E ) in such a way that µ P ≺ π (use Lemma 6), µ P : P {L/x} ⇒ IV G P and G P = sup
• Suppose M = N L and that we are in presence of a redex, i.e. N is in the form λx.R. Then E is simply {λx.R 1 }. From R{L/x} ⇒ IV D, the thesis easily follows. Proof. By induction on the structure of a proof for M ⇒ IN D, applying Lemma 7 and doing some case analysis based on its outcome:
• If M = V and D = {V 1 }, then E = D, because the only rule for values in the big step semantic is ======== bv n V ↓ CN {V }
• If M is an application N L and distributions F , H P,L and derivations ρ, µ P,L exist as in Lemma 7, we can observe, by induction hypothesis, that there exists a distribution I such that N ↓ CN I , where I ≥ F . Then we have that S(I ) ⊇ S(F ). Now, for every λx.P ∈ S(F ), suppose K P,L is such that P {L/x} ↓ CN K P,L . Again by induction hypothesis, we obtain that
• If M is N ⊕ L, we can proceed exactly as for Proposition 2, sum case. This concludes the proof.
Proof. Let us prove the three statements separately:
• If M is a value V , then the only possible judgments involving M are M ⇒ IN {V 1 } and M ⇒ IN ∅. The thesis trivially holds.
• If M is an application N L, then we prove statement 2 by induction on the derivations N ⇒ IN E and L ⇒ IN F . Let's distinguish some cases:
We derive M ⇒ IV ∅ by means of the rule se n and the thesis holds.
• If N ⇒ IN E = ∅, suppose that the least rule applied in the derivation is
1 n E i . It is possible to apply the induction hypothesis on every
• Other cases can be handled similarly to the previous one.
• M is a sum N ⊕ L. The proof is trivial.
Lemma 9 For each term
Proof. The inequalities above can be proved separately:
• If M is a value, the thesis follows by small step semantics rules. Indeed, M ⇒ IN ∅.
• For the other cases, the (≤) direction follows from Lemma 7 and Fact 1; ≥ direction follows from Lemma 8 and Fact 1.
Proof. We will prove the thesis by coinduction: We can prove that all judgments M ↓ CN S IV (M ) belong to the coinductive interpretation of the underlying formal system Φ (in this case, the formal system is Φ = {bv n , ba n , bs n }). To do that, we need to prove that the set A of all those judgment is consistent, i.e. that A ⊆ F Φ (A). This amounts to show that if c ∈ A, then there is a derivation for c whose immediate premises are themselves in A. Let's distinguish some cases: N ) ) : we will prove that the judgment N L ↓ CN S IN (N L) can be derived in a single step from c 1 and those in the family above by means of ba n rule. Simply observe that
The thesis follows applying Lemma 9.
can be inferred in a single step from c 1 and c 2 by means of bs v rules. Clearly, c 1 and c 2 belong to A. Moreover
and by Lemma 9, case 3 we obtain the thesis.
Theorem 4 B CN (M ) = S IN (M ).
Proof. This is a corollary of Proposition 6 and Proposition 5.
CPS Translations and Simulations
In this section we show that in Λ ⊕ it is possible to simulate call-by-value by call-by-name and vice versa. To do that, we follow Plotkin's CPS translation [17] , extended to accommodate binary choice.
It is well known that in the weak untyped lambda calculus, call-by-value and call-by-name are not equivalent notions of reduction. Moreover, the presence of binary choice exacerbates the confluence problem, as shown in Section 2. It is clear that duplications play a central role: in particular, the order in which probabilistic choices and duplications are performed matters.
The presence of binary choices opens a related question about the possibility of including some "administrative rules" distributing sums over the other constructs. The following example shows that it may be critical to include administrative rules:
Example 7 Let us consider the following terms: A study about the observational behavior of terms is a fascinating subject, but is out of the scope of this paper. By the way, this is extensively investigated in the non deterministic setting [6] , in which an algebraic semantics of terms is defined by way of a generalization of Böhm's trees. A further generalization to the probabilistic setting is left to future work.
What we are interested here is to develop an operational study of Λ ⊕ . And an interesting question is clearly whether call-by-value and call-by-name, although being distinct notions of reduction, can be somehow made equivalent through a suitable CPS translation, even in presence of binary choices (with a probabilistic semantics).
In this section, a simulation between call-by-value and call-by-name in Λ ⊕ is proved. We begin with the simulation of call-by-value by call-by-name (Section 7.1), then we will carry on with the simulation of call-by-name by call-by-value (Section 7.2).
Simulating Call-by-Value with Call-By-Name
Suppose to extend Λ ⊕ with a denumerable set of continuation variables C = {α, β, . . .}, disjoint from the original set X of variables of the language. We will call Λ + ⊕ the language of lambda terms extended this way. All definitions and constructions on Λ ⊕ (including its operational semantics) extend smoothly to Λ + ⊕ Call-by-value reduction on Λ ⊕ can be simulated by call-by-name reduction of Λ + ⊕ by translating every term M in Λ ⊕ to a term in Λ + ⊕ , which will be proved to be equivalent to M in a certain sense.
Definition 9 (Call-by-value Translation) The translation map · from Λ ⊕ to Λ + ⊕ is recursively defined as follows:
As expected, call-by-value is simulated by way of so-called continuations. As a consequence, (call-by-value) reduction on M is not simulated simply reducing (in call-by-name), M , but by feeding it with the identity continuation λx.x. Furthermore, we do not obtain this way the same value(s) as the one(s) we would obtain by evaluating M , but something related to that by a function Ψ, which sends values in Λ ⊕ into values in Λ + ⊕ as follows:
Clearly, Ψ can be naturally extended to a map on distributions (of values). The rest of this section is devoted to showing the following theorem, which retraces in Λ ⊕ the classic result from [17] :
Let us get back to the proof. The following fact and the following substitution lemma are necessary.
Lemma 10 extends Plotkin's substitution lemma (see [17] , Lemma 1, page 149)
Proof. By induction on the size of M . An interesting case:
Other cases are very similar to the previous one. This concludes the proof.
We define now the suitable extension of the infix operator ":" introduced by Plotkin in [17] .
Definition 10 (Infix operator ":" for · ) The infix operator ":" for the map · is defined as follows:
The operator ":" can be naturally extended to distributions of values. In this case we will use the notation D : K.
The following lemmas exploit operator ":" and give an important intermediate results in order to prove Theorem 5. As previously declared, Lemma 11 shows that M : K is the result of the computation from M K involving all structural reductions:
Proof. By induction on M and on the definition of ":". Some interesting cases:
• If M is a value, then
• If M is L ⊕ R. There are three subcases:
As a technical tool, we here need a generalization of the small step semantic relation · ⇒ IN ·, that we denote as · ·. The new relation is defined inductively as · ⇒ IN ·, but the first two rules are replaced by the two rules
M ∅ This means, in particular, that the relation above maps terms to distribution over terms, rather than distributions over values.
Of course, relations · ⇒ IN · and · · are strongly related, as shown in the following lemma:
Proof. Simple inductions.
Lemma 13 is an auxiliary tool for the proof of Lemma 14. In particular, these lemmas extend Plotkin's lemma which states that whenever a term M reduces in call by value to a term N , then there exists a call-by-name computation from M : K to N : K. In Λ ⊕ we have to deal with the non deterministic nature of our relations → v and → n (which map terms into sequence of terms), and with the fact that the evaluation of a term returns a probability distribution on values and not a single values.
. . , N n and K is a value, then there are terms P 1 , . . . , P n such that M : K → * n P 1 , . . . , P n and P i → * n N i : K for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Proof. By induction on the structure of M . Some interesting cases.
. . , S n and N i = S i ⊕ R. But by induction hypothesis, there are terms Q 1 , . . . , Q n such that
Notice that, on the other hand:
Now, if S i is a value, then Proof. By induction on the complexity of a derivation for M ⇒ IV D:
K and so we can easily form a derivation for M :
Lemma 15 shows that the call-by-value evaluation of a term M dominates, in term of distributions, the call by-name evaluation of the continuation M : λx.x, up to a suitable translation by function Ψ:
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the complexity of a derivation π of M : λx.x ⇒ IN D. Some interesting cases:
• if M : I ⇒ IN ∅ the thesis follows trivially;
. . N n be such that M → v N . By Lemma 13, there must be derivations ρ 1 , . . . , ρ n (all smaller than π) such that ρ i :
This concludes the proof. 
To prove point 1, we observe that if M ⇒ IV D, then both M K → * n M : K (by Lemma 11) and M : K ⇒ IV D : K (by Lemma 14 and Lemma 12). Now, notice that, for every value V ,
As a consequence, it's clear that
Point 2 is nothing more than Lemma 15. This concludes the proof.
Simulating Call-By-Name by Call-By-Value
In Section 7.1 we proved the "imperfect" simulation of call-by-value by call-by name strategy. The inverse direction is provable in a very similar way. Let us define the extended language Λ + ⊕ as in Section 7.1.
Definition 11 (Call-by-value Translation) The translation map · from Λ ⊕ to Λ + ⊕ is recursively defined as follows:
We also define a function Φ, which sends values into terms as
Observe that Φ sends closed values to closed values. As such, it can be naturally extended to distributions of closed values.
It is possible to state and prove the dual of Theorem 5:
To prove Theorem 6 we need some technical lemmas, as in Section 7.1. We retrace the same proof techniques.
Proof. By induction on the size of M . We give here only the sum case. See [] for other cases.
• If M = L ⊕ R then:
Now the infix operator is defined as:
Proof. By induction on the term M . We give here only the sum case. See [] for other cases.
. . , N n and K is a value, then there are terms P 1 , . . . , P n such that M : K → v P 1 , . . . , P n and P i → * v N i : K for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
As a technical tool, we here need a generalization of the small step semantic relation · ⇒ IN ·, that we denote as · ·, which is defined inductively, but in which the first two rules are replaced by the two rules
Proof. By induction on the complexity of a derivation for M ⇒ IN D:
Proof. The proof goes by induction on the complexity of the derivation π of M : λx.x ⇒ IN D. Some interesting cases:
• If M is a value V :
Proof. [Theorem 6] To prove that Φ(S IN (M )) = S IV ( M λx.x), we proceed by showing the following:
To prove point 1, we observe that if M ⇒ IV D, then both M K → * n M : K (by Lemma 17) and M : K ⇒ IV D : K (by Lemma 20 and Lemma 12). Now, notice that, for every value V ,
Point 2 is nothing more than Lemma 21. This concludes the proof.
On the Expressive Power of Λ ⊕
The lambda calculus Λ ⊕ is endowed with a very restricted form of (probabilistic) choice, which is binary and such that both possible outcomes have probability 1/2. It is thus natural to ask oneself whether this is a essential restriction or not. In this section, we show that this is not essential, by proving that the set of representable distributions on the natural numbers, namely those which can be denoted by a term of Λ ⊕ equals the set of computable distributions, defined in terms of Turing Machines. In this section, we assume to work with call-by-value reduction, even if everything could be rephrased in call-by-name, in view of the results in Section 7.1.
We first of all need to define what a computable distribution (on the natural numbers) is. This is based on a notion of approximation for the function assigning probabilities to natural numbers.
In Λ ⊕ we are able to represent (up to approximation) probability functions from a suitable domain to the real interval R [0, 1] . The notion of approximating function is necessary:
Definition 12 (Approximating function) Given any function f : Q → R [0, 1] , the approximating function for f , denoted Appr f is the function from Q × N to {0, 1} * which on input (a, n), returns the binary string of length n containing the first n digits of f (a) in binary notation.
We define now the class of computable functions:
* is computable.
In the rest of the section we will use the following notation:
Notation 2 Given a proper distribution D that assigns nonzero probability only to representation of natural numbers, the corresponding probability distribution over the naturals will be denoted with {D}.
The next step consists in understanding which class of distributions on the natural numbers can be captured by Λ ⊕ , i.e. is the semantics of a lambda term. For this reason, we assume to work with a fixed encoding of the natural numbers into lambda terms, namely the one usually attributed to Scott [22] . Definition 14 (Representable Distribution) A probability distribution D over the natural numbers is said to be representable iff there is a lambda term M D such that {S IV (M )} = D.
Our main goal will be to prove that the class of representable distributions will coincide with the class of computable distributions: on one hand each distribution obtained by small step evaluation of a lambda term in Λ ⊕ is proved to be computable (Soundness Theorem 7); on the other hand, each computable distribution can be represented by a term in Λ ⊕ (Completeness Theorem 8).
Whatever can be denoted by a lambda term is actually a computable distribution, i.e. one which can be approximated up to any degree of precision by a Turing Machine: Theorem 7 (Soundness) Every representable distribution is computable.
Proof. Suppose D is a representable probability distribution. Then there is a term M such that {S IV (M )} = D. This implies, in particular, that S IV (M ) = 1, because D = 1 itself. An algorithm computing Appr D , then can be easily designed as an evaluator for M : on input (a, n), simply compute distributions D such that M ⇒ IV D, until you find one such that D is big enough as to be able the determine the probability of all values up to the n-th bit.
The completeness theorem requires other definitions and some auxiliary results. To prove expressiveness results, we exploit standard lambda calculus encodings. Natural numbers and binary strings can be encoded as follows: • For every n, λxy.x n is a finite distribution term;
• If M and N are finite distribution terms, then λxy.yM N is a finite distribution term.
Given a finite distribution term M , the underlying probability distribution on the natural numbers {M } is defined in the natural way:
{λxy.x n } = {n 1 } {λxy.yM N } = 1 2 {M } + 1 2 {N }.
Lemma 22 is an intermediate result towards Lemma 23.
Lemma 22 (Fixed-point Combinator) There is a term H such that for every value V , HV rewrites deterministically to V (λx.HV x).
Proof. The term H is simply W W where W = λx.λy.y(λz.xxyz).
Indeed: The following proposition guarantees the existence of a sort of successive approximations function, which computes the distribution of a given term in a finite number of steps.
Proposition 7 (Splitting) There is a lambda term M split such that for every term N computing the distribution D, M split N rewrites deterministically to L, P where • L is a finite distribution term such that {L} = E; • P computes a distribution F; • D = Proof. Only informally, observe that it is possible to find the (sub)distribution E in a finite numbers of steps, by successively querying N (which takes two natural numbers as arguments) in the dovetail order. This way, the (sub)distribution E can always be determined.
By means of Lemma 23 and Proposition 7 it is possible to prove the following completeness result: We will prove the following statement: for any n ∈ N e for all N ∈ Λ ⊕ which computes a distribution E , there exists a distribution D such that M N ⇒ IV D with D ≥ (1 − 1 2 n ) and {D} ≤ E . We will prove the thesis by induction on the natural number n. Observe that, by Proposition 7, M split N rewrites deterministically to the pair L, P , where L is a finite distribution term such that {L} = E L and P is a finite distribution term such that {P } = E P and E = Now observe that, (λs.M fdt L)(λs.s) → M fdt L and by Lemma 23 this term evaluates to {L} = E L . Moreover, (λs.(λt.HV t)P )(λs.s) → 2 (HV )P = M P and we can apply to P the induction hypothesis. Since P compute a distribution E P by induction hypothesis for each natural number n, there exist a distribution D P such that M P ⇒ IV D P with D P ≥ (1 − 
Moreover, D ≤ E . The thesis follows easily.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we studied probabilistic operational semantics for Λ ⊕ , a nondeterministic extension of untyped lambda calculus. We prove strong equivalence results between small-step and big-step semantics, both in call-by-value and in call-by-name. We also extend Plotkin's simulation to our probabilistic setting and we state and prove some results about the expressive power of Λ ⊕ .
Starting from the present paper, several directions for future work are open. On the one hand, some theoretical aspects of the calculus remain unexplored: for example, it should be an interesting topic to develop an observational theory for Λ ⊕ terms. Moreover, the equivalence between inductive and co-inductive semantics seem to be reminiscent of equality between outer measure and inner measure in measure theory: it should be interesting to prove some results in this direction. On the other hand, it is possible to consider Λ ⊕ as a paradigmatic language for stochastic functional programming: it should be fascinating to analyze carefully the relationship between Λ ⊕ and other probabilistic languages (for example, Park's language L γ [14] ).
